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  A Better Way Foundation commissioned the Connecticut Center for Economic 
Analysis (CCEA) at the University of Connecticut to analyze the economic impact that 
shifting to alternatives to incarceration would have for the economy of the State of 
Connecticut.  A broad array of research and statistical findings argue that incarceration by 
itself is both expensive and largely ineffective in modifying behavior.  As a result, states 
and localities have been developing a wide variety of supplemental programs or 
alternatives to incarceration.  A broad array of research argues that these approaches are 
in general more effective in modifying behavior, reducing recidivism, while also 
reducing public sector expenditures.  The economic and social benefits multiply over 
time, as those who receive treatment do not impose future costs on society.    
  This report first presents the methodology and data upon which CCEA developed 
its economic impact analysis.  It then presents the results of that analysis.  The following 
two sections present, first, a broad review of the research and literature nationally that 
both helped shape the approach taken in making the analysis and confirms the level of 
economic benefit that the analysis finds, and, second, a review of the experience in 
Connecticut. 
  CCEA completed two analytical scenarios, one assuming a low rate of utilization 
of alternatives to incarceration, a second assuming a high rate of utilization.  The analysis 
found that the benefits from utilizing alternatives to incarceration would fall in the 
following range: 
￿  Creation of 989 to 3,958 new jobs; 
￿  An increase in Gross Regional (State) Product of $77,000,000 to $311,060,000; 
￿  An increase in Personal Income of $54,170,000 to $215,660,000; 
￿  A net increase in State tax revenues of $11,190,000 to $47,710,000; and 
￿  A net increase in Local tax revenues of $6,330,000 to $27,400.000. 
 
These results are the sum of the annual increases due to the new policies 
compared to no new policies divided by 20, the length of the study period (state bond 
maturation period).  They are therefore the annual average increases (not cumulative) in  
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employment and so on above the status quo forecast of the Connecticut economy.  The 
permanent increases in the above variables are reflected in their terminal year (2022) 
values as follows: 
￿  Creation of 1,136 to 4,526 new jobs; 
￿  An increase in Gross Regional (State) Product of $131,380,000 to $526,760,000; 
￿  An increase in Personal Income of $87,950,000 to $347,500,000; 
￿  A net increase in State tax revenues of $5,900,000 to $31,660,000; and 
￿  A net increase in Local tax revenues of $3,730,000 to $20,720.000. 
 
The values of terminal net state and local taxes are smaller than the averages above 
because the negative expenditures (savings) turn positive in the out years decreasing net 
tax revenues. 
The CCEA analysis thus shows that increasing use of alternatives to incarceration 
would have significant economic benefits for the State and its citizens. 
 
Modeling Assumptions 
The proposed bills reduce the burden on the prison system in Connecticut by 
reducing the number of people incarcerated as well as recidivism rates.  To examine the 
economic effect on the state, we first look at the direct costs of alternative programs.  The 
most recent data available suggests that it costs the state $25,000 per year to incarcerate 
an offender (Legislative Program Review and Investigations Committee report entitled: 
Factors Impacting Prison Overcrowding, December 2000, page 20).  Debt service and 
depreciation on existing facilities should not be added to the operational estimate as these 
expenditures would be required if the prisons were empty.  The current Alternative to 
Incarceration Program in Connecticut on average costs $7000 per year to fund a slot, with 
an average of four clients per slot per year.  There is also a proposal to build, with state 
bond financing, a $20 million, 500-bed, secure, short-term treatment facility that will 
incur estimated operating costs of $5 million per year.   
Insofar as the current system limits access to substance abuse treatment that many 
incarcerated offenders need, it increases the probability that these offenders, once 
released, will continue to commit crimes to support their addictions.  Alternative  
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sentencing programs tackle this problem by providing such treatment and education.  
Benefits to the state and its residents from such programs include amenity values such as 
reduced crime and reduced health care costs, and reduced further arrest and prosecution 
costs.  The Center for Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University completed 
a study from which CCEA drew the following costs to estimate benefits to Connecticut: 
 
¤  $5000 in reduced crime savings per non-violent offender, assuming that drug-using 
ex-inmates would commit 100 fewer crimes per year with $50 in property and 
victimization costs per crime. 
¤  $7300 in reduced arrest and prosecution costs per non-violent offender, assuming that 
they, absent alternative programs, would be arrested twice per year. 
¤  $4800 in health care and substance abuse treatment cost savings per non-violent 
offender, the difference in annual health care costs between substance users and non-
users. 
 
The CCEA analysis includes the possibility of gainful employment for these 
offenders upon successful completion of the “alternative” sentence, assuming all of them 
are employed in the retail sector.  This creates a distribution of workers in several wage 
brackets, including some unemployment. 
For the “incarceration alternatives” scenario, CCEA assumed a low and high estimate 
of offenders that receive the alternative sentence.  Based on historical data from the state 
(from 1990-1995), the analysis assumes a total of 9000 convictions for drug abuse 
violations per year.  The data indicates that the number of offenders incarcerated for these 
violations hovers around 4000.  The objective of the proposed statutes would then be to 
reduce the number of offenders incarcerated for these violations, as well as recidivism 
rates, in the future.   
  Because the ultimate number of offenders that would benefit from the alternative 
programs depends on judicial discretion, the analysis uses a low and high estimate to look 
at a range of results.  The low scenario assumes that 20% of offenders are diverted to 
alternative programs; the high scenario assumes that 80% of offenders are diverted to 
them.    
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The state finances the treatment center with 20-year bonds with an interest rate of 
6.5%.  This translates into level interest payments of $1.82 million per year.  Connecticut 
saves on incarceration costs and arrest/prosecution costs, but incurs costs associated with 
providing offenders alternative treatment.  To balance the State budget, the analysis 
assumes that the personal income rises by 70% of the government spending decrease  
(this is because on average Connecticut taxpayers receive 70c to every dollar that the 
state income tax falls because federal tax liability increases).  The Input Table below 
summarizes the costs and spending changes, with the figures in italics denoting the 
estimates entered directly into the REMI model. 
 
Input Table 
Description of Cost/Benefit  Amount 
State govt.’s costs of constructing the 500-bed treatment facility 
over two years, beginning in 2002 (common to both scenarios) 
$10 million per year, through 2003 
 
State govt.’s cost of financing construction, with bond payments 
over 20 years, with an interest rate of 6.5% (common to both 
scenarios) 
$1.82 million per year, through 2021 
State govt.’s cost of operating facility (common to both scenarios)  $5 million per year, starting in 2004 





          Reduced crime costs  $4.00 mill.  $16.00 mill. 
         Reduced healthcare costs  $3.84 mill.  $15.36 mill. 
Total Amenity Value  $7.84 mill.    $31.36 mill. 
Jobs created in the Retail Sector  800  3200 
           Reduced arrest and prosecution costs  $5.84 mill.  $23.36 mill. 
          Costs per 4 offenders for alternative programs  $1.40 mill.  $5.60 mill. 
          Incarceration Cost Savings at $25,000/person   $20 mill.  $80 mill. 
Govt. spending from 2002-2003 without debt service  -$24.44 mill  - $97.76 mill. 
Govt. spending from 2004 onwards without debt service (including 
operation of treatment facility)  
- $19.44 mill  - $92.76 mill 
Change in personal taxes from 2002-2003 (70% of govt. spending 
change) 
- $17.108 mill  -$68.432 mill 
Change in personal taxes from 2002-2003 (70% of govt. spending 
change) 





PART I: METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
The Connecticut Center for Economic Analysis (CCEA) at the University of 
Connecticut conducted this impact analysis using the State Economic Model, (the REMI 
model), a sophisticated 53-sector replication of the State’s economic structure that can 
project economic impacts out to the year 2035.  The analysis presented here looks at the 
impacts over a period of twenty years, with the year 2002 as the starting point.  The 
objective is to determine the net benefits to the State of Connecticut, by comparing a 
scenario where the relevant laws are enacted to one where they are not.  The status quo 
scenario where the laws are not enacted is the baseline forecast currently embodied in the 
REMI model.  Comparing the results of the two scenarios allows CCEA to look at the 
direct, indirect and induced impacts of the laws in question; CCEA does this in terms of 
employment, gross regional product (GRP), personal income, and fiscal impact in the 
state as a whole.   
The CCEA analysis flows from specific sections of bills that have been raised in 
the legislature.  Table 1 below provides a synopsis of the relevant sections. 
 
Table I 
Bill and Section Number  Contents 
SB 1083   
      Sections 3,6,7,8,9,11,12,13  Judicial Discretion: Allows judges the discretion of taking mitigating circumstances 
into consideration when sentencing under statutes that require mandatory 
minimums, including Sec. 21a-267, Sec. 21a-268, Sec. 21a-278a, and Sec. 21a-279.    
      Sections 4,5  Allows suspending prosecution for substance-abuse treatment (diversion) more than 
once - current law allows offenders to use it only once. 
      Sec 14  Allows violators of Sec 21a-267 (drug paraphernalia) and Sec. 21a-279 (possession) 
to be eligible for community service more than once. 
      Sec 15  Allows violators of Sec 21a-267 (drug paraphernalia) and Sec. 21a-279 (possession) 
to be eligible for a pre-trial drug education program more than once. 
      Sec 18  Allows non-violent offenders w/ "dirty urines" (violated their parole by using drugs) 
to remain in the community. 
      Sec 10  Makes clear that people charged w/ sale offenses and those who have relapsed from 
previous treatment programs are eligible for programs under the "drug court". 
SB 1428  Allows for the presumption of probation for drug treatment for non-violent drug 
offenses, and that such probation shall not be violated for possession, non-
attendance or "dirty urines" until the third time  (also allows pre-sentencing drug 
screening). 
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These bills all propose to reduce the burden on the prison system in Connecticut 
by reducing the number of people incarcerated as well as recidivism rates.  To examine 
the economic effect on the state, we need first to look at the direct costs of alternative 
programs.  The most recent data available suggests that it costs the state $25,000 per year 
to incarcerate an offender (Legislative Program Review and Investigations Committee 
report entitled: Factors Impacting Prison Overcrowding, December 2000, page 20).  
Debt service and depreciation on existing facilities should not be added to the operational 
estimate as these expenditures would be required if the prisons were empty.  The current 
Alternative to Incarceration Program in Connecticut on average costs $7000 per year to 
fund a slot, with an average of four clients per slot per year.  There is also a proposal to 
build, with state bond financing, a $20 million, 500-bed, secure, short-term treatment 
facility that will incur estimated operating costs of $5 million per year.   
Insofar as the current system limits access to substance abuse treatment that many 
incarcerated offenders need, it increases the probability that these offenders, once 
released, will continue to commit crimes to support their addictions.  Alternative 
sentencing programs tackle this problem by providing such treatment and education.  
Benefits to the state and its residents from such programs include amenity values such as 
reduced crime and reduced health care costs, and reduced further arrest and prosecution 
costs.  The Center for Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University completed 
a study from which CCEA drew the following costs to estimate benefits to Connecticut: 
 
¤  $5000 in reduced crime savings per non-violent offender, assuming that drug-using 
ex-inmates would commit 100 fewer crimes per year with $50 in property and 
victimization costs per crime. 
¤  $7300 in reduced arrest and prosecution costs per non-violent offender, assuming that 
they, absent alternative programs, would be arrested twice per year. 
¤  $4800 in health care and substance abuse treatment cost savings per non-violent 




The CCEA analysis includes the possibility of gainful employment for these 
offenders upon successful completion of the “alternative” sentence, assuming all of them 
are employed in the retail sector.  This creates a distribution of workers in several wage 
brackets, including some unemployment. 
For the “incarceration alternatives” scenario, CCEA assumed a low and high estimate 
of offenders that receive the alternative sentence.  Based on historical data from the state 
(from 1990-1995), the analysis assumes a total of 9000 convictions for drug abuse 
violations per year.  The data indicates that the number of offenders incarcerated for these 
violations hovers around 4000.  The objective of the proposed statutes would then be to 
reduce the number of offenders incarcerated for these violations, as well as recidivism 
rates, in the future.   
  Because the ultimate number of offenders that would benefit from the alternative 
programs depends on judicial discretion, the analysis uses a low and high estimate to look 
at a range of results.  The low scenario assumes that 20% of offenders are diverted to 
alternative programs; the high scenario assumes that 80% of offenders are diverted to 
them.   
The state finances the treatment center with 20-year bonds with an interest rate of 
6.5%.  This translates into level interest payments of $1.82 million per year.  Connecticut 
saves on incarceration costs and arrest/prosecution costs, but incurs costs associated with 
providing offenders alternative treatment.  To balance the State budget, the analysis 
assumes that the personal income rises by 70% of the government spending decrease  
(this is because on average Connecticut taxpayers receive 70c to every dollar that the 
state income tax falls because federal tax liability increases).  Table II below summarizes 
the costs and spending changes, with the figures in italics denoting the estimates entered 




Description of Cost/Benefit  Amount 
State govt.’s costs of constructing the 500-bed treatment facility 
over two years, beginning in 2002 (common to both scenarios) 
$10 million per year, through 2003 
 
State govt.’s cost of financing construction, with bond payments 
over 20 years, with an interest rate of 6.5% (common to both 
scenarios) 
$1.82 million per year, through 2021 
State govt.’s cost of operating facility (common to both scenarios)  $5 million per year, starting in 2004 





          Reduced crime costs  $4.00 mill.  $16.00 mill. 
         Reduced healthcare costs  $3.84 mill.  $15.36 mill. 
Total Amenity Value  $7.84 mill.    $31.36 mill. 
Jobs created in the Retail Sector  800  3200 
           Reduced arrest and prosecution costs  $5.84 mill.  $23.36 mill. 
          Costs per 4 offenders for alternative programs  $1.40 mill.  $5.60 mill. 
          Incarceration Cost Savings at $25,000/person   $20 mill.  $80 mill. 
Govt. spending from 2002-2003 without debt service  -$24.44 mill  - $97.76 mill. 
Govt. spending from 2004 onwards without debt service (including 
operation of treatment facility)  
- $19.44 mill  - $92.76 mill 
Change in personal taxes from 2002-2003 (70% of govt. spending 
change) 
- $17.108 mill  -$68.432 mill 
Change in personal taxes from 2002-2003 (70% of govt. spending 
change) 




PART II: RESULTS 
 
Table III presents the primary results from the CCEA analysis in terms of key 
variables.  These results are the sum of the annual increases due to the new policies 
compared to no new policies divided by 20, the length of the study period (state bond 
maturation period).  They are therefore the annual average increases (not cumulative) in 
employment and so on above the status quo forecast of the Connecticut economy.  The 
permanent increases in the variables are reflected in their terminal year (2022). 
Table III – Changes in Key Variables 
Average Annual and Terminal Year Changes above the Baseline 








Employment (Jobs)  989  3,958  1136  4526 
GRP (Mil Nominal $)  $77.00  $311.06     $131.38    $526.76 
Personal Income (Mil Nom $)  $54.17  $215.66  $87.95  $347.5 
Disposable Personal Income 
(Mil Nominal $)  $57.63  $239.39  $84.93  $347.2 
Population (Individuals)  1,488  6,075         1,908    7,818 
 
The proposed alternatives to incarceration create new jobs in the economy, ranging from 
989 jobs to almost 4000 jobs.  The additional jobs result from the multiplier effects 
created by increased production in the economy.  The Gross Regional Product (GRP) 
increase ranges from $77 million to $311 million, and disposable personal income 
increases more than personal income, reflecting the decrease in personal taxes.   
Table IV below shows the fiscal impact of the considered alternatives to 
incarceration.  Because state expenditures on corrections are below the status quo 
forecast or baseline, CCEA projects a significant fiscal impact.  These savings in effect 
augment state and local tax revenue.  These results are the sum of the annual increases 
due to the new policies compared to no new policies divided by 20, the length of the 
study period (state bond maturation period).  They are therefore the annual average 
increases (not cumulative) in employment and so on above the status quo forecast of the 
Connecticut economy.  The permanent increases in the fiscal variables are reflected in 
their terminal year (2022).  
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Table IV – Fiscal Impact (Millions Nominal $) 
Average Annual and Terminal Year Changes above the Baseline 
Fiscal Variable  Low 
Estimate 




State Revenues at State 
Average Rates 
$7.72  $31.38  $12.5  $50.3 
State Expenditures (Savings) 
at State Average Rates  ($3.47)  ($16.33)  $6.6  $18.64 
Net State Revenues  $11.19  $47.71  $5.9  $31.66 
Local Revenues at Adjusted 
State Average Rates  $1.52  $5.79  $5.1  $19.2 
Local Expenditures (Savings) 
at Adjusted State Average 
Rates 
($4.81)  ($21.61)  $1.37  ($1.52) 
Net Local Revenues  $6.33  $27.40  $3.73  $20.72 
 
State revenues increase from a low estimate of $7.7 million to a high of $31.4 million, 
and expenditures fall from a low of $3.5 million to a high estimate of $16.3 million.  
Local revenues increase as well, and local expenditures also fall.  Thus both state and 
local governments see increased revenues in each scenario.   
The graphs in the appendix show the dynamic impact of the proposed changes to 
incarceration policy in the State.  The dips in employment and GRP after 2003 reflect the 
completion of the construction of the treatment facility and the resulting furlough of 
construction workers.  The eventual increases in all these variables reflect the increased 
workforce and productivity in the economy.  Both the low estimate and the high estimate 
scenarios indicate similar movements in the variables, but the dip in employment in 2003 
is not as pronounced in the high impact case as in the low impact one.  The graphs 
depicting the fiscal movements show the decrease in expenditures that occur as the state 
lowers its spending on corrections and the eventual increase in expenditures over the 






PART III: SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
 
  The CCEA analysis shows that alternative programs to incarceration are 
financially beneficial to Connecticut.  The results account for the direct, indirect and 
induced impacts of the proposed alternatives.  In addition, we believe the results are quite 
conservative.  They do not fully incorporate many of the social benefits of these 
programs.  For instance, families of these offenders benefit when they are not 
incarcerated and are treated for their addictions; secondary crime may be reduced through 
less gang activity and other criminal activity in which ex-inmates may get involved.  The 
analysis also makes a conservative assumption about State expenditures, and does not 
incorporate the projected costs to the State of building and maintaining additional prison 
facilities.  The analysis makes clear that utilizing alternatives to incarceration for non-
violent substance abusers and providing offenders with the skills and training necessary 
to pursue productive vocations will benefit both the State government and Connecticut 
residents.          
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PART IV: NON-VIOLENT DRUG OFFENSES IN CONNECTICUT – PAST AND 
PRESENT 
 
Drug Use: In Connecticut, state and local government have given significant attention to 
and devoted considerable resources to controlling the sale and the use of illicit drugs.  
The Governor’s Blue Ribbon Task Force on Substance Abuse estimated that, in 1995, 
65,000 Connecticut residents abused illegal drugs, a number that does not include those 
who merely "use" illegal drugs.  An extrapolation, however, of the figures of the National 
Household Survey suggests that 168,500 Connecticut residents may, in fact, use illegal 
drugs each month, 129,000 who use marijuana. 
The State of Connecticut, as do all states, uses a multi-pronged approach to 
address illegal drugs: it imposes criminal sanctions for drug possession and sale, provides 
treatment programs for the drug addict, and develops education, prevention, and 
intervention programs to prevent or interrupt ongoing use.  
Connecticut places primary reliance for addressing illegal drug use on criminal 
law enforcement and devotes significant law enforcement and criminal justice resources 
to suppress drug use, possession, and trafficking.  That reliance has been increasing.  
Connecticut courts handled nearly 43,000 criminal cases involving drug in the year 
ending June 30, 1995, with over 9000 convictions.  The courts processed nearly 9000 
marijuana drug cases on the misdemeanor charge of possessing less than 4 ounces of 
marijuana; 1700 of those cases resulted in convictions.  As of December 1, 1995, 
Connecticut had incarcerated 4673 individuals for a violation of drug laws as their 
primary offense, an increase of 29% in 14 months.  The State devotes 31% of its prison 
beds are devoted to those incarcerated for drug offenses, an increase of 24% in the same 
14 months.  
Connecticut also directs significant resources to treatment.  Admissions of 
individuals with illegal drug abuse to Connecticut detoxification and treatment programs 
and aftercare services in 1994-95 totaled 30,000.  (Admissions are counted separately and 
an individual can be admitted more than one time during a reporting period.)  The State 
funded or operated 75% of the programs.  In addition, the Connecticut Department of  
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Correction provided both alcohol and drug treatment services to approximately 2400 of 
those incarcerated. 
 
Chronology of criminal law drug legislation: As far back as 1882, Connecticut enacted 
a law regulating the sale of certain drugs and narcotics.  In 1918, four years after the 
federal ban on narcotics, Connecticut enacted its first comprehensive legislation on 
narcotic drugs that prohibited the sale and possession of cocaine, opium, morphine, 
heroin, codeine, and other derivatives.  The statutory penalties for illegal sale of narcotic 
drugs was a $1,000 fine or one year imprisonment or both while illegal possession, by 
anyone other than a licensed medical professional, was subject to a $100 fine or 60 days 
imprisonment or both.  Again following national prohibitions on drugs, a 1939 revision 
of the state’s drug laws included cannabis (marijuana and hashish) as an illegal substance.  
In 1949, Connecticut enacted the Uniform State Narcotic Drug Act, which increased the 
penalties for a violation of the law to a $2,000 fine and up to five years’ imprisonment or 
both.  In 1967 the Legislature adopted the next major piece of drug legislation; it was the 
precursor to the state’s current drug laws.  This law prohibited the sale and possession of 
drugs and established graduated sanctions for first and second offenses.  It defined drug 
abuse and drug dependency.  Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the legislature continued 
to increase the criminal penalties for the sale and possession based on the types and 
amounts of illegal drugs.  
 
Current Criminal Laws: Current Connecticut criminal drug laws, based largely on the 
1989 revisions, are designed to suppress use of illegal drugs by punishing those who 
possess and sell drugs and by discouraging, with the threat of criminal punishment, others 
from possessing and selling drugs.  Sanctions or penalties imposed for violation of the 
drug laws include incarceration, fines, alternatives to incarceration, and mandatory 
treatment programs.  
Table IV-1 lists the laws prohibiting the sale of drugs, the penalties, and any 
exceptions to the penalties, and Table IV-2 describes the offense for possession of drugs.  
As shown, the most serious offense is the sale of heroin, cocaine, or methadone that  
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directly causes a person’s death.  The offense is punishable by a sentence of death or by 
life imprisonment without the possibility of release.  
 
Components of the Criminal Justice System: In Connecticut, the criminal drug laws 
are enforced through the criminal justice system.  That system is represented by four 
components: law enforcement; prosecutors; courts; and, corrections.  
 
Law enforcement: State and municipal police departments are responsible for the 
prevention and detection of crime and apprehension of offenders.  The federal Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA), a federal law enforcement unit investigating the illegal drug 
trade, also provides technical and investigative assistance to state and local police.  The 
Division of State Police, within the Department of Public Safety, has statewide law 
enforcement jurisdiction.  Within the state police special investigations bureau are the 
Statewide Narcotics Task Force and the Gang Unit, both of which have a prominent role 
in the area of substance abuse.  The Department of Consumer Protection also has law 
enforcement authority over alleged drugs and illegal possession of drugs. 
 
Table IV-1. Connecticut Statutes Prohibiting Drug Sale       
C.G.S. 
cite 
Offense Description  Statutory Penalties  Statutory 
Exceptions 
Pre-Trial Diversion  






Sale of heroin, 
cocaine, or 
methadone directly 
causing the user’s 
death: capital felony  
Life imprisonment 
without possibility 
of early release or 
death sentence of 








Sale by a nonaddict 
of at least 1 oz. of 
heroin, cocaine, or 
methadone; 5 mg. of 
LSD; or .5 g. of 
crack 
Mandatory 
minimum 5- to 20-
year prison term, 
possible maximum 
term of life 
imprisonment 
Youth or mental 
impairment: 




Yes  No  No 
21a-
278(b) 
Sale by a nonaddict 
of at least 1 kg. of 
marijuana, or any 




prison term up to a 




prison term up to a 
25-year maximum 
Youth or mental 
impairment: 


















Sale of illegal drug 
by nonaddict within 
1,500 feet of an 
elementary or 
secondary school, a 
licensed day care 
center, or public 
housing project 
Mandatory 3-year 
prison term running 
consecutively to 
prison term imposed 
for violating other 
drug sale law 
  Yes  No  No 
21a-
277(b) 
Sale of any other 
illegal drug 
First offense: up to 
7-year prison term, 
up to a $25,000 fine, 
or both  
Subsequent 
offenses: up to 15-
year prison term, up 
to a $100,000 fine, 


















sentence: up to 3-
year indeterminate 





21a-268  Misrepresentation of 
substance as an 
illegal drug 
Up to 5-year prison 
term, up to a $5,000 
fine, or both 
       
*AR = accelerated rehabilitation  
CSLP = community service labor program 
Source of Data: Connecticut General Statutes and OLR report 95-R-1332 




Table IV-2. Connecticut Statutes Prohibiting Drug Possession       




Other  Pre-Trial Diversion 
        AR*  CSLP*  Treatment 
21a-279(a)  Illegal possession 
of narcotics (i.e., 
heroin, cocaine, 
crack) 
First offense: up to 
7-year prison term, 
up to a $50,000 
fine, or both  
Second offense: up 
to 15-year prison 
term, up to a 
$100,000 fine, or 



























offenses: up to 25- 
year prison term, 
up to a $250,000 
fine, or both 
Alternative 
sentence: up to 3-
year indeterminate 


























21a-279(b)  Illegal possession 
of dangerous 
hallucinogens or 
at least 4 oz. of 
marijuana 
First offense: up to 
5-year prison term, 
up to a $2,000 fine, 
or both  
Subsequent 
offenses: up to 10-
year prison term, 
up to a $5,000 fine, 
or both 
Alternative 
sentence: up to 3-
year indeterminate 




































21a-279(c)  Illegal possession 
of any other drug 
or less than 4 oz. 
of marijuana 
First offense: up to 
1-year prison term, 
up to a $1,000 fine, 
or both  
Subsequent 
offenses: up to 5-
year prison term, 
up to a $3,000 fine, 
or both 
Alternative 
sentence: up to 3-
year indeterminate 





  Yes  Yes  Yes 
21a-279(d)  Possession of 
illegal drugs by a 
nonstudent 
within 1,500 feet 
of an elementary 
or secondary 
school or a 











  Yes  Yes  Yes 
21a-267(a)  Possession or use 
of drug 
paraphernalia 
Up to 3 month jail 
term, up to $500 
fine, or both 
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21a-267(b)  Deliver or 
possess or 
manufacture with 
intent to deliver 
drug 
paraphernalia 
Up to 1-year jail 
term, up to a 
$2,000 fine, or 
both 
       
21a-267(c)  Possession, use, 
or delivery of 
drug 
paraphernalia 
within 1,500 feet 
of an elementary 
or secondary 





       
* AR = accelerated rehabilitation  
CSLP = community service labor program 
Source of Data: Connecticut General Statutes and OLR report 95-R-
1332 
     
 
 
Alternative dispositions: Several statutory alternatives to prosecution are currently 
available to first-time offenders, those charged with minor offenses, or defendants who 
are drug-dependent.  Included among these alternatives are accelerated rehabilitation, 
alcohol education, community service, and court liaison programs.  All such programs 
are administered by the Office of Adult Probation, which supervises program participants 
and ensures compliance with court-ordered conditions.  All of the programs allow for 
charges to be dismissed upon the successful completion of the program.  Table IV-3 




Table IV-3. Alternative Sentencing Options for Adult Criminal Defendants  
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Judicial outcome for successful completion of all alternative sentencing options is 
dismissal of charges.  




Court dispositions: Table IV-4 presents the type of disposition for criminal cases 
involving a drug offense.  Drug offenses are categorized as: sale, possession, and 
paraphernalia violations.  For each fiscal year under analysis, over 70 percent of case 
dispositions were not guilty and nolle (dismissed), which are combined in Judicial 
Department statistical reports.  In FY 94/95, 79 percent of all case dispositions were in 
this category.  
 
Table IV-4. Adult Criminal Court Case Dispositions for Drug Offenses  
FY  90/91  91/92  92/93  93/94  94/95 
Disposition  Guilty  NG & 
Nolle 
Guilty  NG & 
Nolle 
Guilty  NG & 
Nolle 
Guilty  NG & 
Nolle 
Guilty  NG & 
Nolle 
Sale  3,653  6,414  2,881  5,417  2,980  6,723  3,085  7,213  3,262  8,294 
Possession  5,416  15,542  4,505  10,471  4,388  12,443  4,686  11,712  5,499  19,724 
Paraphernalia  739  4,596  597  4,097  368  4,217  433  5,170  428  5,598 
Total  9,808  26,552  7,983  19,985  7,736  23,383  8,204  24,095  9,189  33,616 
NG = not guilty  
Source of Data: Judicial Department 
 
As shown, about one-half of the cases involving the offense of the sale of drugs result in 
a guilty verdict.  Approximately one-third of the drug possession cases result in a guilty 
verdict.  
 
Connecticut treatment system: During the 1960s, substance abuse treatment developed 
into a legitimate field of research and practice.  Two primary treatment modes, "medical" 
and "clinical," emerged and remain the basis for most treatment today.  
Under the medical model, drug addicts are medically treated by maintenance on a 
surrogate drug that substitutes for the illegal addicting substance.  By the late 1960s, this 
model produced the methadone clinic for the treatment of heroin addiction.  The 
prescribed treatment substitutes daily doses of methadone for the illegal heroin.  The  
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clinical model developed as community-based treatment to which substance abusers 
could turn in a crisis situation.  In the early 1970s, public opinion and policy directives 
became less tolerant of persons with substance abuse problems and of the clinical 
treatment approach.  The focus of the drug problem shifted to the effects of substance 
abuse on society rather than on the individual addict.  By the mid-1970s, clinicians 
developed approaches to prevent substance abuse and associated criminal activity.  
Prevention strategies ranged from fear tactics to education, particularly for children, 
about drugs and their effects.  Treatment reemerged into national public view in the 
1980s with the increased use of cocaine.  Treatment programs were necessary to deal 
with new drug users, particularly the middle-class, women, and adolescents, who were 
abusing cocaine.  Federal and state governments responded to the increased use of 
cocaine in the 1980s by initiating a "war on drugs" and establishing particularly severe 
criminal sanctions for drug use.  In 1989, federal funds for residential drug treatment 
were discontinued because substance abuse was reclassified as a mental illness and, 
therefore, not allowable under Medicaid regulations.  
The most recent trend in substance abuse treatment concerns the administration of 
treatment services rather than the manner of treatment.  The managed care model is 
currently being applied to many treatment systems and Connecticut is currently 
developing a statewide network of treatment services based on the managed care 
approach.  Managed care is expected to have a significant impact in the future in 
determining the levels and manner of private treatment that is available to drug abusers.  
 
Substance Abuse Treatment System 
Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services: The Department of Mental 
Health and Addiction Services (DMHAS) is the lead agency in Connecticut’s efforts 
in treating drug abuse.  The services include emergency treatment, inpatient and 
outpatient treatment, intermediate treatment, and follow-up treatment including 
appropriate rehabilitation services.  The department funds a network of community-
based programs and services and administers three residential treatment facilities.  
The department provides treatment services to clients, 18 years and older, who are  
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unable to obtain private care and treatment due to the severity or duration of their 
addiction or their lack of financial resources.  
The Department’s Office of Addiction Services (OAS) provides services to 
persons who are at risk, exposed to, or currently experiencing problems related to 
substance abuse.  It consists of four divisions: Planning; Program Monitoring; Treatment 
and Coordination; and Prevention, Intervention, and Training, each headed by a director.  
Fifteen regional action councils (RAC) assist OAS, were statutorily created to identify 
substance abuse problems, resources, gaps in services, and changes to the community; to 
design programs; and to develop and implement substance abuse treatment plans.  The 
councils do not provide direct services to clients.  
 
Department of Children and Families: The Department of Children and Families funds 
a network of community-based treatment programs and a residential facility for persons 
under 18 years of age.  Children receive treatment either voluntarily (non-committed) or 
involuntarily by court-ordered commitment to DCF as an adjudicated delinquent or as 
part of a family with service needs. 
 
DMHAS Treatment Statistics 
 
Admissions to treatment: Since July 1990, the Department of Mental Health and 
Addiction Services (DMHAS) reported more than 250,000 admissions at either funded or 
provided substance abuse treatment programs or facilities.  It is estimated that over 50 
percent of all alcohol and drug patients are expected to relapse, and 6 percent of those 
who do relapse will do so many times. 
   As shown in Table IV-5, treatment services are categorized as programs funded or 
operated by DMHAS, which also includes federal funds, and those funded by other 
sources, such as private, for-profit clinics.  Although each admission category 
experienced an increase in the number of clients during the past five fiscal years, the 
sharpest rise has been in the number of admissions to DMHAS-operated facilities.  
Admissions in this category dramatically increased 1.9% from FY 92 to FY 93, and have 
continued to increase during the past three fiscal years.  
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  Table IV-5. Number Admissions to Treatment Programs 







90/91  30,765  Est. 7,000  11,453  49,218 
91/92  31,439  Est. 7,000  12,832  51,271 
92/93  32,387  7,133  13,081  52,601 
93/94  33,960  7,707  13,371  55,038 
94/95  34,438  8,097  13,933  49,178 
Total  162,989  33,937  64,670  257,306 
Source of Data: DMHAS Client Information Collection System 
 
Length of treatment: Currently, the average length of stay is about 80 days in a 
community-based treatment program and 40 days at private facilities. 
 
Primary substances: Table IV-6 summarizes Connecticut data for persons treated for 
illicit drugs and shows that heroin abuse accounts for almost half (49%) of the persons 
treated; 36% for cocaine; and 9% for marijuana. 
 
Table IV-6. DMHAS Client’s Primary Drug Abuse 
Problem: FY 95 
Heroin  49% 
Cocaine  36% 
Marijuana  9% 
Other Illicit Drugs  6% 





Alternatives to Incarceration in Connecticut 
Connecticut’s alternative sanctions program has been in place since 1990.  A statewide 
network of more than 50 public and private providers deliver various services such as: 
Community service, Day Incarceration Center, Restitution Center, Family Counseling, 
Mediation, Drug Court, Intensive Supervision Probation, and Substance Abuse treatment.  
Alternative sanctions operate at an average cost of just over $7000 per slot per year, with 
an average of four clients per slot per year.  The average cost for incarcerating an 
offender is approximately $25,000 per year, not including depreciation and debt service 
that are sunk costs.  The state’s Office of Alternative Sanctions estimated in 1998 that, 
without these alternatives, more than 3,500 additional prison and jail beds would have 




PART V: BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A.  Introduction 
Imprisonment of drug offenders and other criminals in the United States has 
grown by 462,006 in the seven decades from July 1,1910 to July 1, 1980, while the 
population grew by 134,817,681 in the same period (a ratio of 1 to 291.80).  In the 1990s 
(July 1, 1990 to July 1, 1999) however, the number of prison inmates grew by an 
estimated 816,965, while the population grew by 23,226,417 (a ratio of 1 to 28.4).  The 
prison population has thus been growing ten times faster than the historical pattern.  The 
United States has 100,000 more incarcerated persons for drug offenses than the entire 
European Union (EU), while the EU has 100 million more citizens than the U.S.  
Between 1980 and 1997, drug arrests tripled in this country.  Prisoners sentenced for drug 
offenses constituted the largest group of Federal inmates (58%) in 1998, up 53% from 
1990.  In September 1998, Federal prisons held 63,011 sentenced drug offenders, 
compared to 30,470 at the end of 1990.  In 1998, drug law violators comprised 22.1% of 
all adults serving time in state prisons – 236,800 out of 1,141,700 State inmates.  In the 
year 2000, the federal, state, and local governments spent almost $24 billion to 
incarcerate non-violent offenders.  Such data prompted retired General Barry McCaffrey, 
former Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, to refer to America’s 
prison system as an “American gulag”.   
The proportion of substance abusers in the criminal justice system is high and has 
grown larger in recent years.  Between 1990 and 1998, the number of total arrests 
nationwide increased by 40%.  One of the largest increases in arrest rates has been for 
violation of laws prohibiting drug sales, distribution and possession—up  168% during 
this time period.  Arrests for drug violations grew at four times the rate of increase for 
violent felonies.  In the same nine-year period, the number of inmates in the United States 
more than tripled and the state and federal prison population increased 299% and 417% 
respectively.  Nationally, in 1997, 83% of state prison inmates were substance abuse 
involved.  The percentage of state prison inmates sentenced for a drug law violation 
increased from 6% in 1980 to 23% in 1996 (Belenko, 2000).  
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But this dramatic increase in incarceration at every level has been by all accounts 
ineffective.  A recent United States Department of Justice finding concludes "higher rates 
of arrests, stricter laws, and more aggressive sentencing policies do not deter many drug 
users exposed to these penalties" (Harrell, 2000, emphasis added). Harrell et al believe 
that this reliance on incarceration leads to a "revolving door scenario in which drug-
involved offenders appear repeatedly before the courts" (Harrell, 2000).  For instance: 
One study found 60 percent of opiate-dependent Federal parolees were re-
incarcerated within 6 months of release—virtually all for narcotics-related 
crime—at an incarceration cost of more than $27,000 per person, per year. 
(Metzger, 1996) quoted in (Harrell, 2000).  
 
  Harrell et al also argue that drug treatment is effective even with the most 
hardened addicts: 
Contrary to popular opinion, drug treatment is effective — not everyone 
and not all the time, but, on average, it works….  The National Treatment 
Improvement Evaluation Study found 40-50% of regular cocaine and 
heroin users who spent at least 3 months in treatment were almost drug-
free in the year after treatment, regardless of the treatment type (Harrell, 
2000, p. 2). 
 
Despite such findings, and despite numerous advances in the last 20 years in 
mental health treatment and substance abuse interventions, they are used rarely.  A 1994 
survey of 37 state and federal prison systems by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) 
and the Center of Disease Control and Prevention found that only 5% of all inmates 
received either residential substance abuse treatment or ambulatory substance abuse 
counseling.  A survey conducted in 1992 by National Institute of Justice revealed that 
only 28% of the nation’s jails offered drug abuse treatment, and only 19% funded drug 
treatment programs (National Institute of Justice, Research Report, 1995).  Of the drug 
treatment programs, 12% were isolated from the general jail population.  The average jail 
drug treatment program focused on white inmates (who constituted 66% of the 
participants), and the average age of the participant was 26 years.  The average number of 
inmates served in the program was 42, and the staff size was three.  More than 80 percent 
operated without volunteer staff.  In the Federal Bureau of Prisons system, 61% of those 
incarcerated were convicted of drug-related crime.  But, according to a 1993 analysis 
(National Institute of Justice, Research Report, 1995, p. 20), only 21% of the inmates were  
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“low-level” drug-law violators; that is, they had no current or prior convictions for 
violence, no record of criminal activity and no prior offenses.  This of course reflects the 
high rate of recidivism. 
U.S. Department of Corrections data show that about a fourth of those initially 
imprisoned for nonviolent crimes are sentenced for a second time for committing a 
violent offense.  Whatever else it reflects, this pattern highlights the possibility that 
prison serves to transmit violent behavior and values rather than to reduce them.  The 
ONDCP (Office of National Drug Control Policy) in its 2000 annual report detailed 
administration requests for major increases in funding to the Federal Bureau of Prisons 
for drug-related prison construction.  These include an additional $420 million in fiscal 
year 2001, and advanced appropriations of $467 million in 2002, and an additional $316 
million in 2003—all drug-related.  Since the enactment of mandatory minimum 
sentencing for drug users, the Federal Bureau of Prisons budget has increased by 1,350%.  
Its budget has jumped from $220 million in 1986 to $3.19 billion in 1997. 
Despite abundant research on the relation between drug use and criminal activity, 
access to treatment appears limited for criminal offenders relative to their need.  The 
adjudication process for arrested drug-involved offenders is complex, involving a number 
of agencies, personnel, and locations.  Although this makes it difficult to plan and 
coordinate the delivery of treatment services, it also means there are numerous entry 
points at which services might be provided.  Intervention points for criminal justice-based 
treatments include: pre-arrest diversion, pre-arraignment diversion, pretrial intervention, 
and post-conviction intervention.  One of the methods in use currently is the diversion 
program, where recent arrestees are offered an opportunity to have their cases held in 
abeyance while they participate in a court-monitored treatment program.  
 
B.  Alternatives and Effectiveness 
Because reliance simply on incarceration as a solution to America’s drug dilemma 
has proved both very costly and largely ineffective, states have begun to experiment with 
approaches that reduce costs of incarceration and, perhaps more important, modify 
behavior of non-violent offenders to reduce recidivism.  A wide range of alternatives 
exists, such as intensive supervision probation, house arrest, day reporting centers, and  
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electronic monitoring.  Intensive probation supervision programs (Georgia, New Jersey) 
have been successful in restraining growth of prison populations and associated costs by 
controlling selected offenders.  “Drug Courts” have also emerged; these are dedicated 
courtrooms that provide judicially monitored treatment, drug testing, and other services 
to drug-involved offenders.  The mission of drug courts is to stop the abuse of alcohol 
and other drugs and related criminal activity.  Approximately 400 drug courts operate 
nationwide.  New York and Chicago initiated the concept of dedicating specified 
courtrooms solely to drug cases in the early 1950s; in the early 1970s, New York 
established “Narcotics Courts” in response to the rise heroin abuse.  Dade County, 
Florida began the first treatment-oriented drug court in 1989.   
Probation—serving a sentence while under official supervision in the 
community—is the most popular form of correctional treatment in United States.  Courts 
use probation nearly three times more in sentencing convicted offenders than 
incarceration (either local jail or state & federal prisons.  One recent trend among judges 
is to use probation as a supplement to a period of incarceration.  The combination of 
prison and probation takes four forms: split sentence (a period of incarceration followed 
by probation), modification of sentence (reconsider a sentence and modify it to 
probation), shock probation (released after a period of time in confinement and re-
sentenced to probation), and intermittent incarceration (spend weekends or nights in a 
local jail).  Programs now typically differentiate between high risk and low risk offenders 
(Byrne, 1988).  
Data for 20 states reveals that the proportion of adult probationers who 
successfully completed their term ranged from 66% in Mississippi to 95% in Vermont.  
The percentage incarcerated for new offenses varied from 5% in Vermont to 23% in 
Mississippi.  States that use a classification system usually identify success and failure 
rates for offenders receiving minimum, moderate, and maximum supervision.  In these 
states, failure rates (i.e., re-arrest within 1 year) often are as low as 10-15% for minimum 
supervision cases and as high as 50-60% for maximum intensive supervision cases.  
Petersilla and Turner (1986) report that prisoners had a significantly higher recidivism 
rate (72%) than a similar group of felons (63%) on probation.  They found no significant  
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recidivism differences between groups in the seriousness of crimes committed or in the 
time before re-arrest (6 months for both).  
 
Legislation 
Although 36 states currently have mandatory minimums in place for drug 
offenses, one of the first states to enact such mandatory sentences, Michigan, recently 
moved to ease some of the more draconian provisions of its so-called "650 Lifer" drug 
laws.  Passed in 1978, the 650 Lifer law meted out mandatory sentences of life without 
the possibility of parole for persons caught with at least 650 grams of heroin or cocaine. 
After a heated debate, the Michigan legislature passed, and the governor signed, a law 
that allowed parole for some 650-lifers after they served 15 or 20 years, depending on 
their prior record. 
Similarly, in 1994, Congress passed a "safety valve" to the federal mandatory 
drug provisions, which allows judges to sentence offenders below the mandatory 
minimum if the offender has a minimal prior record, the offense is nonviolent, and the 
offender cooperates with prosecutors.  According to The Sentencing Project, "Since the 
adoption of this provision, 20% of federal drug cases are now sentenced in this way, 
providing an indication of the degree to which low-level offenders are being prosecuted." 
 
Judicial Efforts 
Recently, a statewide panel convened by New York State's Chief Judge Judith S. 
Kaye announced what it described as "sweeping new reforms to provide court-mandated 
substance abuse treatment to nonviolent drug-addicted offenders throughout the state."  
According to the New York Times, the reforms would make New York the "first state to 
require that nearly all nonviolent criminals who are drug addicts be offered treatment 
instead of incarceration."  The Commission on Drugs and the Courts, convened under the 
aegis of New York's Unified Court System, developed a plan that would divert 10,000 
defendants from prison or jail into treatment at an estimated savings of $500 million a 
year in incarceration and other taxpayer costs.  
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  In 1998, there were some 22,670 drug offenders in the New York State prison 
system, about one-third of all prisoners.  Over 90% were there because of two mandatory 
sentencing laws passed in 1973 known as the Rockefeller Drug Laws.  It costs New York 




In the early 1990s, voters in Arizona approved an initiative that diverted 
nonviolent defendants convicted of drug possession from prison as well as medicalizing 
marijuana.  Disturbed over the passage of what it considered an irresponsible initiative, 
the Arizona legislature forced a second vote on the same issue, and, in November 1996, 
voters again approved the Drug Medicalization, Prevention, and Control Act ("the Act").  
In December 1996, the Act established the Drug Treatment and Education Fund to create 
drug treatment slots for offenders who would be diverted from prison under the Act.  
In a March 1999 report from the Arizona Supreme Court found that 2,622 
probationers participated in treatment under the program in its first year.  There was a 
98.2% matching rate between recommended and actual placements and, at the time of the 
report, there was a success rate of 61.1% for the 932 probationers for whom treatment 
completion data was available.  The Supreme Court researchers estimated that the 
program achieved a saving of $2,563,032 in incarceration costs during its first year of 
implementation net of treatment and probation costs.  The researchers estimated that 
Adult Arrests – New York 
 
  1996  1997  1998  1999  *2000 
Total Arrests  569,721 589,761 595,812 553,444 571,143
Total Felony  199,302 199,233 198,235 181,366 177,496
Violent  64,296 63,911 60,270 54,057 52,402
Drug  56,941 53,316 58,004 51,248 47,435
Other  78,065 82,006 79,961 76,061 77,659
Total Misdemeanor  370,419 390,528 397,577 372,078 393,647
Drug  69,632 79,772 98,266 94,527 117,483
DWI  42,869 42,397 42,656 39,556 39,304
Other  257,918 268,359 256,655 237,995 236,860
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these savings would increase in subsequent years as the initiative achieved full 
implementation. 
The California Campaign for New Drug Policies placed the Substance Abuse and 
Crime Prevention Act on the ballot for November 2000.  As with the Arizona initiative, 
the California Act would send those convicted of nonviolent drug possession charges to 
treatment centers instead of prison.  Those convicted of selling or manufacturing drugs 
would be ineligible for diversion, as would those with convictions for violent offenses in 
the five years previous to sentencing. 
Even with these limitations, the non-partisan California Legislative Analyst's 
Office estimates that the measure will reduce the state's prison population 25,000 and the 
population in county jails another 12,000, saving the state between $100 million and 
$150 million a year and counties $50 million a year.  There would be additional one-time 
savings of $500 million in prison construction costs.  To pay for the new drug treatment 
slots, the initiative requires establishment of a $120 million superfund, generated from 
the savings in prison costs.  The state would funnel these monies to counties to provide 
treatment for offenders diverted from incarceration. 
The Sheriff’s office in Tennessee’s Davidson County began looking into jail 
alternatives for certain offenders because of overcrowded conditions in the county’s jails.  
When Sheriff Gayle Ray came on board, there were no alternative sanction programs in 
place. In 1998, the sheriff’s office received grants worth close to $1 million from the 
federal Byrne Memorial Grant Fund to support the day reporting center that was created 
for non-violent misdemeanor services.  The program paid off, according Diane Moore, 
Director of the Davidson County Sheriff’s Office Day Reporting Center.  
First, the per diem cost for participation is much lower than that in 
the jails.  The jail’s per diem cost is about $39 whereas the center’s per 
diem cost is around $10. For the right individual who can make it on this 
program and is also working, they are paying their family bills and taxes 
and they are not a wholesale drain on the community.”  
 
Research suggests that post-incarceration continuation of services improves 
outcomes, and that the longer treatment continues the more positive the outcomes.
1  One 
                                                                 
1 For example, three years after release from prison, only 27% of clients of California’s Amity program 
who completed aftercare had been re-incarcerated, compared with 75% of similar inmates who received no  
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element of this is providing probation officers a continuum of sanctions ranging from 
least severe to most severe to consider when a violation of the special drug aftercare 
condition occurs.  These violations include technical violations such as, failing to report 
for tests, stalls, attempting to beat the test or contaminating the specimen, flushed 
specimen, failing to participate in counseling sessions, alcohol use, positive drug test 
results as well as legal violations.  The range of options to use include admonishments 
(written and verbal) by the probation officer and supervisor, written admonishment by the 
U.S. parole commission, verbal admonishment by the court (which requires more time 
and work), lengthen the time in the current phase, increase the phase level, increase the 
supervision level, community service, alcoholics/narcotics anonymous meetings, 
outpatient counseling, electronic monitoring, community correctional center 
participation, reside and participate in sober living program, arrest-shorter term custody-
reinstatement to supervision, intermittent incarceration, therapeutic community and 
finally, arrest, custody and recommendation for revocation (Torres, 1998). 
Assignment to a therapeutic community (TC) or residential drug treatment is one 
of the major methods used when an offender has a positive drug test.  This is considered 
the most severe of all sanctions because it effectively can be considered a form of 
incapacitation or removal from community.  Many probation officers believe this is too 
harsh, but this strategy has apparently proven to be effective in deterring drug use and 
preventing new criminal conduct.  These sanctions are based on the belief that 
consequences for drug after care violations, especially drug use, should be swift, certain 
and predictable.  Verification of compliance is critical if the officer is to maintain 
credibility and. hence, effectiveness.  A major tenet of this strategy is that offenders must 
be held accountable for their decision to use drugs.  The supervision strategy is 
implemented by an approach that provides certain predictable sanctions for drug after 
care violations.  These range from a mild admonishment to an intensive residential drug 
treatment program, with a last resort to arrest and revocation. 
Because prison treatment evaluations have focused on residential programs, more 
research is needed on the effectiveness of other types of interventions.  Further, treatment 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
treatment and 79% of inmates who received treatment in prison but no aftercare.   Delaware’s Key-Crest 
program has achieved similar results.  
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alone is not enough.  Programs serving inmate populations must deal with the “whole 
person”—poverty, unemployment, and poor health.  Drug-free housing and family 
support are especially important factors in recovery.  Data on jail and prison inmates 
illustrates the extent of social and multiple health problems  from which drug offenders 
suffer and which need to be addressed simultaneously to improve effectiveness of the 
program.  The complexity and multiple layers of the criminal justice system also impact 
the delivery of treatment services. 
 
C.   Experiences from other States 
 
Several programs have been carried out in various states, including Arizona, New York, 
Florida, New Jersey, Texas, Wisconsin, California, Oregon and Delaware.  These 
programs show that there is a strong positive relationship between number of months in  
alternative programs and the percentage of people successfully discharged from the 
parole for male therapeutic community (TC) group who were in treatment for 12 months. 
In case of females, inmates for drug offense, TC was effective in reducing recidivism 
rates, but counseling showed no such effect. 
 
Arizona 
In the early 1990s, voters in Arizona approved an initiative that diverted nonviolent 
defendants convicted of drug possession from prison, as well as medicalizing marijuana.  
Disturbed over the passage of what it considered an irresponsible initiative, the Arizona 
legislature forced a second vote on the same issue and, in November 1996, the Drug 
Medicalization, Prevention, and Control Act ("the Act") was again passed.  In December 
1996, the Act established the Drug Treatment and Education Fund to create drug 
treatment slots for offenders who would be diverted from prison under the Act.  
 
A March 1999 Arizona Supreme Court report found that 2,622 probationers participated 
in treatment under the program in its first year.  There was a 98.2% matching rate 
between recommended and actual placements and, at the time of the report, there was a 
success rate of 61.1% for the 932 probationers for whom treatment completion data was  
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available.  The Supreme Court researchers estimated that the program achieved a net 
saving of $2,563,032 in incarceration costs during its first year of implementation after 
subtracting treatment and probation costs.  The researchers estimated that these savings 
would increase in subsequent years as the initiative achieved full implementation (Sunny 
Kaplan, May, 1999). 
 
Oregon 
  According to one study, in Oregon every dollar spent on drug treatment saves 
$5.60 in costs for prison, welfare, and other expenses (G. Field, 1992). 
 
Texas 
The Texas initiative has a program for non-violent drug offenders (Substance 
Abuse Felony Punishment [SAFP]) where they could receive 6-12 months of long-term 
treatment, who were then assimilated back into the community through a 15-month 
continuum of care that incorporated a support system of decreasing intensity and 
structure.  They also had an in-prison therapeutic treatment system where incarcerated 
offenders were to receive long-term, intensive chemical dependency treatment before 
returning to the community, where they were given treatment similar to SAFP program.  
Only 7.2% of those who had completed three or more months had been re-incarcerated, 
in contrast to 18.5% of those who did not receive treatment.  The drop out rate was 42%. 
In another Texas program, the New Vision Chemical Dependency Program, of 
343 inmates referred during the second half of 1993, 80% completed the program 
(Simpson and Knight (1995).  The progress of graduates was compared to that of a 
matched sample from the general prison population who also met all treatment eligibility 
requirements but did not have enough time left to serve to be able to participate.  Data 
from the half the scheduled 6-month follow-ups revealed that 6 months after leaving 
prison, parolees who received TC treatment were less likely to be arrested than those who 
did not receive treatment (15 % and 20% respectively) and less likely to have used 
cocaine or crack (7% and 26% respectively).  
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The 61% who completed a 3-month residential care program after leaving prison 
did better on several outcomes – committing crime, being employed, and being arrested – 
than did parolees who did not complete the aftercare program.  See the table below. 
 
Texas New Vision Chemical Dependency Program: Completion of Aftercare  
  Completed 
3 or more months 
Did not complete aftercare 





Held legal employment 
 





















For a justification of alternatives to incarceration, California experience provides 
the best example to think about a better solution than incarceration. 
During the past two decades California experienced a 25-fold increase in 
the number of drug offenders sentenced to state prison. As a result of this 
increase California led the nation in drug offender incarceration with a rate 
of 115 per 100,000 of the population —2.5 times the national average (45 
per 100,000 population for 36 reporting states) ... By 1999, California's drug 
imprisonment rate rose to 132 per 100,000 (Macallair et al, 2000, p. 1). 
 
Macallair  et al. show that in California there are two kinds of counties with 
different outcomes.  The outcome differences depend upon whether some counties have 
high rates of imprisonment for drug violations or not.  They found counties with two 
kinds of measures: (1) counties that imposed high rates of imprisonment for drug 
violations and (2) counties that imposed low rates of imprisonment for drug violations.   
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They observed that in the high-imprisonment counties there is almost no distinction 
between the worst and the least drug offenses in terms of punishment.  These counties 
chose to combat their drug abuse and crime problems by making more felony and 
misdemeanor drug arrests.  Therefore, the strict focus here is on both the worst and the 
least drug offenses.  The consequence of this measure is that "counties that imposed high 
rates of imprisonment for drug violations generally experienced SLOWER declines i n 
index felony offenses than low-imprisonment counties" (Macallair, 2000, emphasis in the 
original). 
  On the other hand, low-imprisonment counties chose to combat their drug abuse 
and crime problems by concentrating only on the worst (felony) drug offenses (i.e., 
manufacturing and trafficking).  Therefore, the focus here is on a meaningful distinction 
between the worst and the least drug offenses.  They found that these counties had 
considerably more success in reducing crime regardless of the dimensions of their drug 
abuse and crime problems.  Even though the results were not statistically significant, they 
discuss three major reasons for these outcome differences.  
  The first reason they suggest is that the correlation between simple possession 
drug offenses and high rates of crime or drug abuse is close to zero.  So it follows that 
increasing arrests for low-level drug possession does nothing to control crime.  A 
noteworthy consequence is that increasing nonviolent offenders "may drain resources 
away from more productive strategies" (Macallair, 2000).  In other words, the 
opportunity cost of incarcerating simple drug offenders is too high for society.  It is not 
efficient.  The problem is that not only taxpayers have to pay for incarceration, but also 
that this measure is taking away resources from the economy. 
  A second reason is that "felony drug offenses appear to reflect, rather than 
control, higher rates of drug abuse and crime" (Macallair et al, 2000):  
 
As shown, counties that stepped up felony drug arrest rates did not show 
the most impressive improvements in violent and property crime rates 
(although the San Francisco exception indicates that areas with extremely 
high rates of drug abuse may benefit from policing of the worst drug 
offenses).  For most jurisdictions, however, increasing felony drug arrests 
is a very limited strategy to control rising drug abuse and crime 
(Macallair, 2000).  
38 
  
Finally, "counties that reduced misdemeanor drug arrests and switched to 
judicious enforcement of felony drug laws enjoyed the healthiest reductions in violent 
and property crime" (Macallair, 2000). 
  The lessons that can be learned from the California case suggest that "(a) strong 
enforcement of drug possession laws is ineffective in reducing crime, and (b) felony drug 
arrest is a strategy that should be used sparingly and carefully targeted" (Macallair, 
2000).  According to another study, in California every dollar spent on treatment results 
in $7 in savings on reduced crime and health care costs. 
 
California’s Amity Prison Therapeutic Community: 




















Delaware’s Key-Crest model is a 3-stage model, built around two Therapeutic 
Communities (TCs): the Key, a prison-based TC for men and the Crest, a residential 
work release center for both men and women.  The evaluation of the program contrasted 
participants in the Key alone, participants in Crest alone, and participants in the 
combined program, with inmates who received no treatment other than HIV prevention 
education.  The research found highly positive results as measured by percentage drug-
free and arrest-free after 6 months.  The robust findings through the two stages of 
research are: 1) length of time in treatment and 2) the degree of involvement in treatment 
are important for success.  Even controlling for these influences, participation in the  
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prison TC in combination with the work release TC treatment continuum significantly 
improves outcomes (Inciardi, 1995, in NIJ research report, 1995).  
 
Delaware’s Key-Crest program: 
Key crest participants: Drug free and Arrest free longer 



















































Another method is the Drug Treatment Alternative Program (DTAP), established 
by the Kings County, NY district to divert into treatment non-violent felony offenders 
with one or more prior felony convictions and a documented history of drug abuse.  The 
sentences are deferred while undergoing 16-24 months of intensive residential therapeutic 
community programs.  Since its inception in 1990, 3617 non-violent offenders have been 
screened of whom, 70% were rejected treatment.  Of the 30% accepted, 37% have 
graduated and 21% are still in treatment.  DTAP uses legal coercion to keep participants 
in treatment and has produced a one-year retention rate of 66% that is two-thirds of those  
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who were accepted into the program remained in treatment for at least a year.  
Recidivism data indicates that successful participation lowers re-arrest rates.  Re-arrest 
rates for three years 184 post-DTAP and 215 drug offenders who did not participate in 
the program were 23% and 47% respectively. 
An evaluation of a New York-based program conducted in 1984 showed that male 
participants had arrest rates of only 26% compared to 40.9% for those having no 




  The target population for Georgia’s program was “prison bound” nonviolent 
offenders of whom 43 percent committed property offenses, 41% drug and alcohol 
offenses, and 9% violent crimes.  Preliminary figures suggest it has been cost- effective.  
The average annual cost of incarcerating an offender in Georgia is $7760, compared with 
an average annual cost of $985 per offender for intensive supervision probation (ISP).  
Probation fees range from $10-50 per month.  There was a 10% decrease in the 
percentage of felons sentenced to incarceration during the period under study, along with 
a corresponding 10% increase in probation caseloads statewide Edward J. Latissa 
 
Illinois 
  Offenders in Chicago can spend up to 18 months in jail awaiting trial or 
sentencing for drug related crimes.  While they wait, those with non-violent criminal 
histories can receive treatment from Treatment Alternatives for Special Clients (TASC), a 
non-profit agency providing court-approved treatment.  The programs, aimed to reduce 
prison overcrowding, provide substance abuse treatment, education, and job training 
tailored to specific treatment needs of each offender.  Participants remain in the program 
for an average of 70 days, although some continue as long as 18 months.  The 
participants live at home and are closely monitored; failure to comply with program rules 
and policies will send them back to jail.  According to the Illinois Criminal Justice 
Information Authority, 99 percent of the participants miss no court appearances, 
compared to 35 percent in general population.  Less than 5 percent of the participants  
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have been re-incarcerated.  TASC costs only $39 per day, compared to $89 per day to 
keep offenders in jail.  [Drug Strategies, Washington, DC] 
 
Washington 
  In 1995, the Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative was added to provide a 
sentencing option for drug offenders.  Under this law, one-half the normal mid-range 
sentencing is to be served in confinement with treatment, with the balance of the balance 
of sentence in a community custody situation, subject to re-imprisonment if community 
conditions and treatment recommendations are violated.  A “boot camp” sentencing 
alternative was established in 1991 for certain non-violent offenders, who are given credit 
for three days for each days served in the Work Ethic Camp Program, and then placed in 




  A 1992 Minnesota study found that providing treatment for drug abusers saved 
the state $39 million in one year because of hospitalizations, detoxification and arrests.  
These savings, which begins as soon as the addict enters treatment, offset 80 percent of 
the program costs (Young, 1994).  
 
D.  Cost-Benefit Analyses of Alternatives to Incarceration 
The concept of cost-benefit defines the relationship between the resources 
required to attain certain goals and the benefits derived (Washington, 1976).  However, it 
is not a wholly satisfactory tool for evaluating social programs because it is incapable of 
accurately measuring “social” costs and benefits (Vito and Latessa, 1979).  However, 
when combined with other measures of program effectiveness and impact, the cost-
benefit information can prove a valuable instrument.  This section summarizes the work 
done using this approach. 
One of the problems facing ISP is the dilemma of accurately selecting offenders 
appropriate for higher levels of supervision.  What constitutes intensive supervision?  The 
number of cases assigned to an officer as well as the number of required contacts can  
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have a tremendous impact on the cost of the program.  Programs in New Jersey and 
Georgia where two officers are assigned caseloads of 10 with contacts made on an almost 
daily basis are different from traditional programs where average caseloads of 25 
offenders per officer and an average of four contacts per month.  The philosophy of an 
ISP program has an impact on cost.  A program that has control-orientation may require 
more contacts, but may in fact be cheaper than a program that is treatment-oriented.  
Such programs will either develop in-house programming or rely upon community 
resources.   
Earlier research did not focus on cost effectiveness, “… since costs do not provide 
a common denominator in probation evaluation…”  (Banks, 1977).  In the 1960s and 
1970s, offenders were placed into different levels of supervision with little screening or 
classification.  In most cases, all these offenders were already under community 
supervision.  Unlike previous experiments, the new generation programs are specifically 
designed to reduce prison populations through the diversion of offenders that otherwise 
would be committed to penal institutions.  Effectiveness is related specifically to the 
length of time an individual remains in treatment, regardless of type of treatment 
provided.  The chronic nature of drug addiction and a high possibility of relapse make the 
treatment ineffective.  Viewed from a health perspective, treatment should be followed by 
a cure, with no further drug abuse.  Viewed from the perspective of a legislator and the 
lay public, the outcome of the treatment should be reduced recidivism (a reduced 
tendency to return to criminal behavior), together with elimination of or substantial 
reduction of drug abuse.  In the field of corrections, the health goals and criminal justice 
goals are not implemented coherently, which often leads to conflicts (National Institute of 
Justice, 1995).  
The effectiveness of Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) programs could be 
measured with respect to short-term as well as long-term outcomes.  Short-term outcomes 
could be rule infractions, positive tests for drugs, and participation in institutional 
programs.  Long-term outcomes could be inmates’ drug use and criminal activities, 
recidivism, social and occupational functioning, and mental/physical health (BOP drug-
abuse program, 1993).  
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In Georgia’s 1982 program, two probation officers were assigned caseloads of 10 
offenders, with at least 5 contacts per week required.  Costs were estimated at 
$1,375,351, covered by funds derived from collection of probation fees.  The cost of 
supervising a probationer was $4.37 per day, with an average cost of $694.83 per 
offender during the program.  This compared to $29.63 per day for incarceration costs.  
Daily cost of supervision was estimated at $0.75 per day.  
  Georgia’s benefits included probationers’ net earnings, taxes, restitution, court 
costs and fines, probation fees, and community service hours valued at minimum wage.  
Overall the dollar value of benefits estimated as $1,456,256.93.  In the New Jersey 
program, offenders were selected for ISP after they had served 3-4 months of their 
sentence.  Here too, the evaluators estimated benefits to exceed costs.  All of the above 
programs are found in states that have centralized probation services that facilitate the 
development and implementation of intensive supervision projects.  To promote such 
programs (TC, ISP) at the county level, several states have developed probation subsidy 
grants to local jurisdiction (e.g., Ohio).  In general the costs include costs of 
incarceration, parole supervision, clerical support, public transfer payments, community 
resources, and recidivism costs.  A final assumption of cost benefit analysis is that 
secondary costs and benefits can be accurately and quantitatively measured, which is not 
easy.  Offenders do not pay taxes, and their families frequently draw welfare benefits.  
There are psychological effects of alienation/imprisonment, social stigma and other 
detrimental effects upon the prisoner’s marriage and family.  On the other hand, they do 
not draw unemployment benefits, should they otherwise be eligible, and perhaps the most 
difficult calculation is the cost of new crimes.  
The strategy implemented by Central District of California (CDC) in Los Angeles 
is based on a philosophy of rational choice rather than the traditional disease model of 
addiction.  The policy implications from a choice model lead to total abstinence approach 
with predictable consequences for drug use and associated aftercare condition violations.  
In the CDC, the officer retains the discretion to determine appropriate sanctions, but the 
policy clearly suggests that some consequences follow any incident of drug use.  It 
attempts to balance the goal of community protection through rapid detection and 
intervention while also holding the individual accountable for the decision to use drugs or  
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otherwise violate the special drug aftercare condition.  Torres (1997) discusses the 
continuum of sanctions for substance-abusing offenders and focuses on alternatives to 
incarceration.  The Northern District of California and District of Nevada has 
implemented several other programs along the lines of the CDC approach.  Petersilia and 
Turner (1993) report that recidivism was reduced to 20-30% (from an unreported level) 
in programs in which offenders both received surveillance (e.g. drug tests) and 
participated in relevant treatment.  They also point out that drug offenders under criminal 
justice supervision stay in treatment longer, thereby increasing positive treatment 
outcomes (Petersilia, 1996).  
Barriers to treatment reported by the National Center on Addiction and Substance 
Abuse (CASA) at Columbia University based on a prison survey identifies 71% 
responses as budgetary limitations.  Other problems include few counselors, inadequate 
space, too few volunteers, frequent inmate transfers, general correctional problems such 
as security issues, aftercare issues and legislative barriers.  Steven Belenko and Jorda 
Reugh (1998) suggest that there are substantial economic benefits that flow from an 
investment in treatment.  They estimated that the cost per inmate of providing residential 
treatment in prison for a year is $3500, in addition to existing incarceration costs.  
Education and voluntary training and aftercare costs are $3000, which is a total of $6500 
for a comprehensive treatment and training program.  They also estimated that for each 
inmate who successfully completes a treatment program and returns to the community as 
a sober parolee with a high school degree and a job, the following economic benefits 
would accrue just in the first year of release: 
(1) $5000 in reduced crime savings per offender, assuming that drug-using ex-inmates 
would have committee 100 crimes per year with $50 in property and victimization 
costs per crime. 
(2) $7300 in reduced arrest and prosecution costs per offender, assuming that they would 
have been arrested twice per year. 
(3) $19,600 in reduced incarceration costs per offender, assuming that one of those re-
arrests would have resulted in a one-year prison sentence. 
(4) $4800 in health care and substance abuse treatment cost savings per offender, the 
difference in annual health care costs between substance users and non-users.  
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(5) $32,100, in economic benefits per offender ($21,400—the average income for an 
employed high school graduate—multiplied by the standard economic multiplier of 
1.5 for estimating the local economic effects of a wage).  
Under these assumptions, the total benefits that would accrue in the first year 
would be $68,800 for each successful inmate.  Such benefits do not include anticipated 
reductions in welfare, other state or federal entitlement costs, or foster care.  Accordingly, 
the success rate needed to break even on a $6500 per inmate investment in prison 
treatment is fairly modest: if just 10% of the inmates are successful, the treatment 
investment is more than returned.  Moreover, a RAND study of the relative cost-
effectiveness of treatment, domestic enforcement, interdiction, and source country control 
found that for heavy users of cocaine, treatment interventions would cost one-seventh as 
much as enforcement to achieve the same reduction in cocaine use (Rydell et al., 
Operations Research, 1994).  A comprehensive study of the economic benefits of drug 
treatment shows that they were seven times greater than the costs of treatment (Gerstein 
et al., 1994). 
Another study by Knight and Hiller (1997) examines one of the first substance 
abuse treatment facilities established in Texas as an alternative to incarceration for 
substance-abusing probationers.  Overall one-year follow-up outcomes (lower arrest 
rates) were highly favorable for graduates of the Dallas county judicial treatment center 
(DCJTC program), particularly for those who entered the residential aftercare component 
of the treatment continuum.  The study used a logit regression model to predict (i) being 
arrested within one year after leaving treatment and (ii) being arrested within one year 
after leaving treatment for DCJTC graduates.  Texas had more inmates in county jail 
backlog (30,574) awaiting transfer to prison than most states had in their entire prison 
system and at least one third of those sentences to community corrections were 
specifically for drug offence (Fabelo, 1996a).  
A study on Boot camp drug-treatment and its effectiveness (NIJ, 1995), attempted 
to evaluate the effectiveness of boot camp programs along two dimensions: the 
competency of drug-treatment paradigm to deal with offender’s drug problems, and the 
role drug treatment plays within the larger boot camp/aftercare effort to change offender 
behavior.  Specific therapeutic strategies and program characteristics have been identified  
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by researchers, based on which principles of effective treatment have been suggested by 
researchers (Andrews and Keisling 1980; Pendergast, 1993; Peters, 1993; Andrews and 
Bonta, 1994; in Boot Camp drug treatment, NIJ research report, 1995). 
Drug courts beginning in the mid-1980s provide dedicated courtrooms for drug 
cases mainly to speed up processing of cases, the first one being in Miami, in 1989.  
Research on drug courts suggests that these programs are able to engage drug offenders 
in long-term treatment and other services, which have limited treatment exposure in the 
past.  Other alternatives include Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime (TASC), 
probation-based treatment and Corrections-based and parole treatment.  The Jefferson 
County drug court program is based upon the Dade County Florida model, which diverts 
first-time, drug possession offenders into a 12-month community treatment program that 
includes acupuncture and development of social and educational skills and is monitored 
directly by a drug court judge.  If the judge believes that the offenders are trying to break 
the pattern of addiction, offenders remain in treatment even after they tested positive for 
drugs several times.  The core of the program is a 1-year (minimum) treatment program 
divided into three phases: detoxification, stabilization and aftercare.  The specialty of the 
program is that treatment and education programs are combined with direct judicial 
oversight and involvement.  The clients selected for the study include those possessing 
cocaine, belonging to Jefferson County, but should not possess more than 1-2 ounces of 
cocaine or having a history of violent offenses or prior drug arrests.  Studies on 
effectiveness of drug court programs show only one instance where drug court clients had 
a lower re-arrest rate (Miami) and three studies from five sites (Chicago, Maricopa 
County, Milwaukee, New York City and Philadelphia) where they did no worse than 
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